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Many businesses compete in multiple markets which can cause businesses to temper their price 
adjustments, affecting price dispersion. The authors propose a framework based on major characteristics 
of competition and market structure which influence price dispersion. The focus of this study is the U.S. 
airline industry analyzing data from 5,974 city pair routes. The results of this empirical analysis show 
that multi-market contact and the interaction of market concentration with multi-market contact have 
considerable effects on price dispersion. An understanding of these effects provides valuable insights for 




Businesses focus setting prices and adjusting prices to influence demand and profitability. In many 
service markets, such as airline tickets, hotel rooms, and entertainment venues, diverse prices are 
frequently offered by different businesses to cater to various market segments having particular sets of 
wants and needs. This variation in prices (i.e., price dispersion) is not only based on customer 
heterogeneity, but also on competition and market related characteristics. The effect of some important 
aspects of competition and market structure has been largely overlooked in extant research on price 
dispersion. Understanding the presence or absence of exploitable imperfections in markets and the 
implications for developing pricing strategies are critical for the long-term viability of businesses that 
must compete in environments with increasingly informed customers (Clemons, Hann, & Hitt, 2002).   
A pricing strategy is a rational selection from a range of possible prices targeted for meeting a firm’s 
objectives planned to respond to a specific situation (Tellis, 1986). Effective pricing strategy is based on a 
thorough understanding of the target market including the nature and complexity of; products, consumers, 
competitors, and market structures (see Monroe, 2003; Nagle & Holden, 2002). Recent advances in 
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information technology, such as digital products, real time computational abilities, intelligent agent 
technologies, and database marketing, open a vast array of pricing strategy possibilities (Dixit, Whipple, 
Zinkham, & Gailey, 2008). 
This research seeks to provide understanding of how competitive forces and market characteristics 
influence price dispersion.  Price dispersion impacts consumers’ perceptions of value and purchase 
behavior which in turn affects sales revenue and profitability of firms and industries. Specifically, we 
focus on the following research questions in this study: 1. How does multi-market contact, the degree to 
which rival firms compete in different markets, affect price dispersion? 2.  How does market 
concentration affect the relationship between multi-market contact and price dispersion? If the forces 
affecting price dispersion are better understood, managers may be able to develop enhanced business 
strategies and plans, leading to higher performance.  
Price dispersion is the variation in prices of homogeneous products sold by competing firms (Stigler, 
1961; Borenstein & Rose, 1994; Zhao, 2006). Stigler’s (1961) seminal article discusses the effect of the 
differences in customer search costs on price dispersion. Stigler states that price dispersion is ubiquitous 
even for homogeneous products. Stigler’s conclusion is that price dispersion is caused by consumers’ lack 
of information due to search costs and variation in ‘terms of sale’. 
Prior research findings indicate that markets for many homogeneous products are characterized by 
considerable price dispersion (e.g., Stigler, 1961; Pan, Ratchford, & Shankar, 2004). Emerging streams of 
research suggest that specific types of market imperfections (e.g., Lindsey-Mullikin & Grewal, 2006; 
Grewal & Marmorstein, 1994), customer learning (e.g., Johnson, Moe, Fader, Bellman, & Lohse, 2000), 
and brand loyalty (e.g., Chen & Hitt, 2001) influence price dispersion. These scholars mainly focus on 
consumer related influences on price dispersion. The effects of multi-market contact, an important 
influence on competitive pressure and price dispersion, have not been studied.    
Our study contributes to price dispersion research in several important ways. First, it provides a much 
needed conceptual framework of price dispersion in a complex, service market (i.e., airline ticket). 
Second, it empirically examines the influence of previously unexplored competition related variables, 
such as multi-market contact, and the interaction of market concentration on the effect that multi-market 
contact has on price dispersion. Third, it contributes managerial insight to decision makers in retail 




Scholars in marketing have investigated the effects of price dispersion on key marketing variables as 
well as the causes of price dispersion. A review of literature resulted in two major streams of research; (1) 
consumer heterogeneity (including search cost, customer learning, and brand loyalty) and (2) market 
structure and competition. A study by Anacarani and Shankar (2004) evaluates the influence of the 
Internet on price dispersion of books and music CDs across Internet-only retailers, traditional retailers, 
and multi-channel retailers. Their results show that multi-channel retailers have the most price dispersion, 
traditional retailers the second highest price dispersion, and Internet-only retailers the least price 
dispersion. These findings indicate that the online markets offer opportunities for retailers to differentiate 
prices within and across the retailer types, similar to traditional markets.  
Biswas, Dutta, and Pullig (2006) studied the moderating role of perceived price dispersion on low 
price guarantees. Price dispersion is evaluated as a signal for lowest price in a retail environment using 
mock ads for a branded DVD player. The results show that price guarantee effects are attenuated when 
consumers perceive price dispersion to be high for a given product. The results also indicate that a low 
price guarantee with progressively higher levels of penalty leads incrementally to more favorable effects 
on key consumer outcomes when perceived price dispersion is high. The effect of increasing the penalty 
level had no such incremental benefit on consumer outcomes in the situation of low perceived price 
dispersion.   
Zhao (2006) evaluated price dispersion in the grocery market and checked for the consistency of 
evidence of price dispersion with theories related to consumer heterogeneity, consumer search, and 
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competition. Zhao applies these three influencers of price dispersion to evaluate price dispersion in three 
situations; (1) for a specific brand across stores, (2) within a product category in a store across brands, and 
(3) over time for a specific brand. Zhao’s research shows price dispersion to positively correlate with 
consumer heterogeneity, consumer search, and competition, which is consistent with the theories related 
to price dispersion. 
 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
 
According to the ‘law of one price’ supply and demand determine a single price for a homogenous 
product, regardless of the number of sellers and buyers. In reality, it is well known by marketing scholars 
and economists that ‘one price’ rarely, if ever, occurs in real markets. Homogeneous products are often 
sold at widely differing prices by competing firms, even in markets that are highly competitive, such as 
the U.S. airline ticket market. This study examines key competitive and market factors that may influence 
price dispersion, and evaluates the consistency with theories. Specifically, it examines multi-market 
contact and the interaction with market concentration as influencers of price dispersion. 
We present a conceptual framework in FIGURE 1 (See Appendix). As shown in the diagram, price 
dispersion is influenced by two groups of independent variables; one group of competition related 
characteristics and another group of local market related characteristics. This conceptual framework 
indicates the expected relationships between the independent variables and the dependent variable, price 
dispersion. In the following section we discuss each construct and derive hypotheses. 
 
Multi-Market Contact 
Prior literature has typically studied price dispersion in single markets, and has not examined the 
relationship between multi-market contact and price dispersion. Multi-market contact is defined as the 
level of competitive contact, which firms in an industry have in multiple markets (Bernheim & Whinston, 
1990; Karnani & Wernerfelt, 1985; Evans & Kessides, 1994; Baum & Korn, 1996). For any pair of rivals 
in a market, multi-market contact represents the number of other markets in which the same pair of firms 
met as competitors. Thus, multi-market contact between two competing firms in a given market reflects 
the degree of market overlap between those firms in the other markets. 
The theory of multi-market competition (Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999) implies that 
multi-market contact between two rival firms will reduce the intensity of rivalry between them in each 
market where they compete (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990). Even though multi-market contact indicates 
that firms are competitors across sub-markets, the theory suggests that the intensity of rivalry in each of 
the mutually contested markets will be low. The reason for such an effect, according to the theory, is that 
firms with high multi-market contact have an extended scope for retaliation to actions taken by the rival 
because the possibility for cross-market retaliation is a likely possibility (Feinberg, 1984).   
Although there are differing views on the influence that multi-market contact may have on 
competition, the conclusions of most research (e.g., Bernheim & Whinston, 1990) supports the premise 
that as multi-market contact increases, intensity of rivalry will decrease. This decrease in competitive 
rivalry is expected to result in an increase in price dispersion due to firms feeling less pressure to match or 
be close to competitors’ prices. The theoretical predictions are consistent with the rivalry-decreasing 
effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion and are represented in the following hypothesis: 
 
Hypothesis 1: The degree of multi-market contact among firms competing in a local 
market is positively related to price dispersion in the local market. 
 
Market Concentration within a Local Market  
Prior studies have examined the relationship between market concentration and price dispersion in a 
market. Market concentration is the degree of dominance of firms selling similar products within a 
specific market. Greater concentration of market share increases the market power of the dominant firms, 
which in turn results in higher prices. In the extreme case of concentration, a single firm totally dominates 
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the market (i.e., monopoly). The concept of greater market concentration leading to greater market power 
of dominant firms and resulting in higher prices, has been well documented and is one of the main 
justifications for the U.S. Government monitoring and limiting industry concentration.   
Price dispersion has an inverted-U relationship with market concentration. In the case of the city-pair 
routes in this study, the relationship of price dispersion to market concentrations is on the side of the 
inverted-U where the relationship is negative; as concentration increases, price dispersion decreases.   
Market concentration is typically measured by the Herfindahl index (also referred to as the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index), which is the market share for each firm competing within a market, squared, 
and then summed. Market concentration is one of the independent variables applied by Borenstein and 
Rose, (1994); Hayes and Ross, (1998); and Zhao (2006) to evaluate the causes of price dispersion. All 
three of these studies find the expected result that price dispersion is inversely related to concentration. 
Simply stated, as a market becomes more concentrated, price dispersion tends to be reduced. In this study, 
the city-pair route is the sub-market of interest and therefore, concentration of airlines is calculated using 
the Herfindahl index methodology on each city-pair route. The following hypothesis reflects the expected 
inverse main effect relationship between market concentration (city-pair routes in this study) and price 
dispersion. 
 
Hypothesis 2: The degree of market concentration in a local market is negatively related 
to price dispersion in the local market. 
 
Multi-Market Contact and Market Concentration Interaction 
In this study a major factor of interest is the interaction of multi-market contact, which can potentially 
affect oligopolistic coordination within specific markets, with market concentration. The effect of multi-
market contact on price dispersion is expected to be moderated by market concentration (Jayachandran, 
Gimeno, & Vanadarajan, 1999). The airline industry is an oligopoly and the local markets tend to exhibit 
a high degree of concentration. Most of the other studies, which assess the effects of multi-market 
contact, evaluate markets that are less concentrated with fewer local markets.  In this study the local 
markets are the 5,974 city-pair routes that are analyzed. Based on prior literature, in markets that that are 
highly concentrated, it is predicted that the effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion is less. As a 
result, the increase of price dispersion due to increasing multi-market contact is reduced. The following 
hypothesis reflects this rationale.   
 
Hypothesis 3: When market concentration is greater, the effect of multi-market contact 
on price dispersion decreases. 
 
FIGURE 2 (See Appendix) shows that at high levels of market concentration, multi-market contact 
has a lesser effect on price dispersion. Notice that the ‘high market concentration’ is below the ‘low 
market concentration’ line. When market concentration in a market is greater (‘high market 
concentration’ in the graph), the effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion is less than when 
market concentration is less (‘low market concentration’ in the graph), as stated in the hypothesis. 
 
Market Size  
Market size has been measured in several ways, such as the number of customers or sales volume 
(monetary value or units sold). In this study, market size is the volume of passengers on a city-pair route 
relative to the most frequently traveled route. In essence, market size measures how many passengers 
travel on the route, regardless of the number of airlines on the route. 
In Borenstein and Rose’s (1994) study, market size (referred to as market density) was measured by 
the total number of flights on the route. They found that in larger markets, there is less price dispersion. 
This finding is consistent with models of monopolistic competitive price discrimination (Borenstein, 
1985; Holmes, 1989) and is hypothesized in this study. The rationale of this finding is that in larger 
markets there are more customers, who increase the competitive pressure on the airlines, resulting in less 
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price dispersion. Borenstein and Rose’s (1994) findings support the hypothesis that market size will 
increase the intensity of rivalry experienced by a firm. These empirical studies and rationale support the 
following hypothesis: 
 




Route distance is the linear distance between the cities at each end of the city-pair route. This variable 
was applied as an independent variable by several researchers (e.g., Borentstein, 1989; Evans & Kessides, 
1994; Hayes & Ross, 1998) to evaluate pricing related dependent variables. Borentstein (1989) evaluates 
the importance of route and airport related variables on price levels on airline routes. One of the route 
variables is route distance and they found route distance to be positively related to the price level on city-
pair routes. Route distance is applied by Hayes and Ross (1998) to evaluate the causes of price dispersion. 
Their research finds that dispersion is greater on longer route distances. This leads to the following 
hypothesis that on longer route distances there tends to be greater price dispersion.   
 
Hypothesis 5: The distance of a city-pair route is positively related to price dispersion on 
the route. 
 
Hub Airport  
In 1978, the U.S. Congress enacted the Airline Deregulation Act, which transformed the domestic 
airline industry from extensive government regulation to a new era of competition (Nannes, 2000). Prior 
to the Airline Deregulation Act, carriers largely provided point-to point service. Following deregulation, 
the airlines began to consolidate their operations at specific airports, forming what came to be known as 
hubs. A “hub” airline combines “local” passengers (i.e., those originating at or destined to the hub) with 
“connecting” passengers (i.e., those passing through the hub) on the same flight. The approach, referred to 
as hub-and-spoke, allows “hub” airlines to serve more cities from their hubs (known as spoke routes) and 
offer greater frequency of service with its aircraft than had been possible with point-to-point service. 
Notwithstanding the benefits, the dominance of spoke routes by hub airlines raises concern about the 
exercise of market power on those routes. Prior research shows that airlines can and do charge higher 
prices on routes connected to hubs than on non-hub routes where they face more competition. Hub control 
is a measure of market power (Borenstein, 1989).  Borenstein finds that airlines had greater market power 
in their hubs and as result, price levels were higher and price dispersion was less on routes. In our study, 
the focus is on price dispersion that occurs on the city-pair route for all of the airlines in the study and not 
the pricing of individual airlines. Hayes and Ross (1998) apply this variable and find that price dispersion 
was less in hub airports than in non-hub airports. This leads to the following hypothesis that less price 
dispersion is expected at hub routes.   
 
Hypothesis 6:  When a city-pair route is connected to a hub airport, there is a negative 




The following is a description of the data applied in this study, the empirical model, and the 
calculation method for the dependent variable, price dispersion measurement: 
 
Data Description  
The data used in this study are from the Origin and Destination Survey of Air Passenger Traffic. The 
Origin and Destination database consists of a 10% random sample of all airline passenger tickets issued 
by all airlines on a quarterly basis for each city-pair route in the U.S. For cities with multiple airports, the 
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data are at the airport level. This study focuses on the routes of seven network and ten low-fare airlines 
during the first quarter of 1999. There are approximately 7,000 city-pair routes in this data set. In this 
study, only the routes with two or more airlines on a route are included. As a result, 5,974 routes are 
included in this study.   
 
Empirical Model   
Multiple regression analysis is applied in this study. The following equation is the empirical model 
for the conceptual model described above. 
 
PRDij = β0 + β1MMCij + β2HHIij + β3MMCijxHHIij + β4MSZij + β5DSTij + β6HUBij+ εij 
 where; i and j are the city pairs. 
PRDij = price dispersion on the city pair route 
MMCij = multi-market contact among airlines on the city pair route 
HHIij= market concentration based on airlines on the city pair route 
MSZij =market size based on passengers on the city pair route 
DSTij = route distance between cities on the city pair route 
HUBij=hub airport based on either terminal being a hub 
εij = error term related to the city pair route 
 
Price Dispersion Measurement – Dependent Variable 
The Gini coefficient measures the degree of inequality of a variable in a distribution of its elements.In 
our study, price dispersion is based on the variation in airline ticket prices for the same city-pair route 
offered by competing airlines. Gini is calculated from the average price charged to customers by each 
airline for each city-pair route per quarter. The Gini coefficient (also referred to as Gini index or Gini 
ratio) is the most widely used statistical measure of income inequity (Abounoori & McCloughnan, 2003). 
The Gini coefficient is an index of inequality, with values closer to unity associated with higher 
inequality. The Gini coefficient is expressed as (Abounoori & McCloughan, 2003, p. 505):   
 
G = 1 – 2  ∫01 l(z)dz 
 
where z is the cumulative proportion of price payers (i.e., customers) and l is the corresponding 
cumulative proportion of prices paid.  
 
FIGURE 3 (See Appendix) provides an example of the Gini coefficient measurement of price 
dispersion. The Gini coefficient is based on comparing the cumulative share of price paid (vertical axis) 
relative to the cumulative share of passengers (horizontal axis). The curved line is a graphical 
representation of price dispersion. The area between the curved line and the 45o is the Gini coefficient; in 
this case 0.302. When there is less price dispersion, the Gini coefficient decreases and the price dispersion 
line approaches the 45o line. When there is more price dispersion, the Gini coefficient increases and the 
price dispersion line approaches the lower right corner. 
The Gini coefficient is superior in this application to the other measures of inequality mentioned 
above, due to its inclusion of the measurement of non-normal (and non-uniform) distributions and the 
potential for calculated values to be continuous, range from zero to one, and ratio data. A value of zero 
value occurs when these is uniform prices, which means that there is zero price dispersion. The value of 
zero is referred to as ‘perfect equality’ and occurs on one route in this data set when there are two airlines 
with identical average prices. The value of one is referred to as ‘perfect inequality’ and does not actually 
occur because it would mean that all passengers except on pays nothing and one passenger pays 








The following is a description of the independent variables applied in this study and the calculation 
method for each variable. 
 
Multi-market contact is a measure of the potential for strategic market encounters between airlines (Baum 
& Korn, 1996). Baum and Korn (1996) develop a methodology for evaluating the level of competition 
between firms that compete in many different local markets. Baum and Korn’s methodology is based on 
calculating (for only the firms competing in a sub-market) the number of other sub-markets where the 
firms compete and then divides this number by the maximum number of potential sub-markets where the 
firms could compete. The range of values for the Baum and Korn’s approach to measuring multi-market 
contact is zero to one. This study applies the Baum and Korn’s methodology.   
 
The multi-market contact for firm i in a focal market m is measured using the number of contacts that 
firm i has with the competitors in market m competing in markets different from focus market mat time t 
as follows: 
 




Dimt is an indicator variable set equal to one it firm i is active in a market m at time t and to zero 
otherwise.   
N is the number of firms j that contact the focal firm i in market m that are multi-market contacts 
(i.e., that firm i encounters in at least one market other than m) and all other terms are as defined 
above.  
 
Multi-market contact can vary from zero, when there is no multi-market contact, to one, when firm i 
engages all other firms in market m in all of M in its own markets. Given that similar indices have been 
previously used (e.g., Baum & Korn, 1996; Gimeno & Woo, 1996; Fuentelsaz & Gomez, 2006), this 
approach to measuring multi-market contact provides the possibility of comparing the results of this study 
with those of the earlier studies. 
 
Market concentration is the degree of dominance by firms selling similar products within a specific 
market. Market concentration is typically measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI), which is calculated by 
squaring the market share for each firm (i.e., airline) competing within a market. In this study, the city-
pair route is the sub-market of interest and therefore, concentration of airlines is evaluated on each city-
pair route. The Herfindahl index is calculated using the number of passengers per airline on the city-pair 
route each quarter.   
 
The Herfindahl index has been applied as an independent variable in many studies including 
Borenstein and Rose (1994) and Hayes and Ross (1998) to evaluate the causes of price dispersion in the 
airline industry. The Herfindahl index can vary from near zero, in a market where a very large number of 
firms compete, all with near zero market shares, to one, when there is only one firm with 100% market 
share. 
 
Market size is the number of passengers on a city-pair route. Market size measures how many passengers 
travel on the route, regardless of the number of airlines on the route. Borenstein and Rose (1994) apply a 
similar independent variable, based on the total number of flights. In this study, market size is calculated 
by dividing the number of passengers on the route by the maximum number of passengers on the route 
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with the most passengers on a single city-pair route and can vary from near zero, on a route where there 
are very few passengers, to one, the route with the most passengers. 
 
Route distance is the linear distance between the cities at each end of the city-pair route.  Route distances 
the United States vary from 11 to 2,770 miles. This variable has been applied in a several studies on 
pricing levels on airline routes (e.g., Borentstein, 1989; Evans & Kessides, 1994). Hayes and Ross (1998) 
apply this variable to evaluate causes of price dispersion and scaled route distance by dividing by 1,000. 
In this study, the route distance variable is calculated by dividing each city-pair route distance by the 
longest route distance resulting in values from nearly zero to one. 
 
Hub airport is a zero or one, dichotomous variable, which indicates that an airline’s hub is at one or both 
ends of the city-pair route. If neither endpoint is a hub, the value is zero and if either or both endpoints are 
hubs, the value is one. Hayes and Ross (1998) apply this variable to evaluate causes of price dispersion. 




The following sections explain the descriptive statistics, estimation results for the hypotheses, and 
the model fit. 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
In TABLE 1, the means, standard deviations, and Pearson correlation matrix for the variables of 
interest are presented. The correlations between the independent variables are relatively small and 
therefore, multicollinearity is not a concern in this analysis. The largest correlation (0.37) is between 
market concentration and route distance. 
 
TABLE 1 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS (n = 5,974) 
 
   Correlation Coefficients 
 Variable Mean Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 
 Price Dispersion 0.059 0.0006      
 Multi-Market Contact 0.248 0.0010 0.08     
 Concentration 0.458 0.0031 -0.43 0.14    
 Market Size 0.027 0.0008 -0.13 -0.29 0.01   
 Distance 0.416 0.0031 0.32 0.10 -0.37 -0.09  




The following estimation results are explained for the hypotheses previously discussed and based on 
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TABLE 2 
REGRESSION RESULTS  
 
 
Variable Hypothesis Coefficient Estimate Beta Pr>ltl 
H1 Multi-Market Contact 
Degree of MMC is positively related 
to price dispersion. 0.193 0.327 <0.0001 
H2 Market Concentration 
Degree of HHI is negatively related to 
price dispersion. -0.029 -0.127 0.0006 
H3 MMC x HHI As HHI increases, the effect of MMC on price dispersion decreases. -0.236 -0.377 <0.0001 
H4 Market Size Market size is negatively related to price dispersion. -0.053 -0.073 <0.0001 
H5 Route Distance Length of the route is positively related to price dispersion. 0.033 0.164 <0.0001 
H6 Hub Airport 
When a route is connected to a hub, 
there is a negative effect on price 
dispersion. 




H1 is supported (β1 = 0.327), indicating that in city-pair routes where multi-market contact is greater, 
there is more price dispersion. In other words, when competitors in a local market have more contact in 
markets, the price dispersion tends to be greater in the local market. This finding is consistent with the 
research of Baum and Korn (1996), which found that in local markets where multi-market contact is 
greater, the entry and exit rates are lower, indicating a reduction in competitiveness. This study supports 
the premise that if firms feel less need to compete aggressively, they have more latitude in pricing, 
therefore in local markets where multi-market contact is greater, there is larger price dispersion.  
The beta coefficient of multi-market contact is relatively large (0.317) compared to all but one of the 
other beta values, which range from 0.044 to 0.377. This relatively large value indicates that multi-market 
contact is a key variable in influencing the dependent variable, price dispersion. Multi-market contact has 
the coefficient estimate of 0.193, which is the highest of the main effect variables and is only second to 
the interaction variable that has a coefficient estimate of -0.236. This result supports the multi-market 
contact theory, which postulates that as the degree of multi-market contact increases, price dispersion 
should increase. This finding demonstrates the considerable positive effect that multi-market contact has 
on price dispersion.   
 
Market Concentration 
H2 is supported (β2= -0.127), indicating that in local markets where concentration is greater, price 
dispersion in that market tends to be less. In other words, in markets where market shares are more 
concentrated, less price dispersion occurs. These results are consistent with Borenstein and Rose’s (1994) 
study on price dispersion in the U.S. airfare market. They analyzed pricing data to evaluate the effect of 
competition on price dispersion. Market concentration is one of the variables used by Borenstein and 
Rose to evaluate the construct ‘competition’. Borenstein and Rose found that in local markets where 
market concentration is higher, there is less price dispersion. Market concentration is also applied by 
Hayes and Ross (1998), Walsh and Whelan (1999), and Zhao (2006) to evaluate the causes of price 
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dispersion. Their findings reinforce the finding that in more concentrated markets, price dispersion tends 
to be less.   
Market concentration has the coefficient estimate of -0.029, which is relatively small compared to 
multi-market contact, but still has a significant negative influence on price dispersion. This result supports 
the oligopoly theory, which postulates that firms collude, either tacitly or purposively, within markets 
when they recognize their mutual dependence. The more concentrated the market, the greater recognition 
of the firms’ mutual dependence, resulting in less price dispersion. This rationale is consistent with the 
finding of this study that as concentration in a local market increases, there tends to be less price 
dispersion. For example, if market concentration on a city-pair route increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (a 20% 
increase in market concentration) price dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.040 to 0.038 (a 5% 
decrease in price dispersion). In comparison to multi-market contact, market concentration has less effect 
on price dispersion.  
 
Interaction of Multi-Market Contact and Market Concentration  
H3 is supported (β3 = -0.377), indicating that the effect of multi-market contact on price dispersion is 
less in local markets where there is greater market concentration.  In other words, in local markets where 
there is a higher degree of market concentration, the increase in price dispersion (that occurs as multi-
market contact increases) is less than it would be in less concentrated markets. This finding is consistent 
with prior literature which indicates that in markets where concentration is greater, the effect of multi-
market contact on price dispersion is reduced, and as a result there is less of an increase in price 
dispersion. This finding demonstrates that even though multi-market competition reduces competitive 
pressure, when markets are highly concentrated, there are relatively few firms setting prices, which has a 
reducing effect on price dispersion. 
 
Market Size  
H4 is supported (β4 = -0.073), indicating that in larger local markets, price dispersion in that market 
tends to be less. In other words, in larger markets (i.e., more customers), less price dispersion occurs. 
Market size has the coefficient estimate of -0.053, which is the second highest of the main effect 
variables. This finding is consistent with Borenstein and Rose’s (1994) study, which found that in larger 
markets, there is less price dispersion. Their findings support the rationale that in larger markets (i.e., 
more customers) there is more competitive pressure on the airlines, resulting in less price dispersion. 
Furthermore, the finding of this study is consistent with models of monopolistic competitive price 
discrimination (Borenstein, 1985; Holmes, 1989). For example, if market size on a city-pair route 
increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (20% increase in market size) price dispersion can be expected to decrease 
from 0.024 to 0.031 (8% decrease in price dispersion). In comparison to multi-market contact, market size 
has less effect on price dispersion, but more than market concentration.  
 
Route Distance  
H5 is supported (β5 = 0.164), indicating that as route distance increases, there is greater price 
dispersion. In other words, longer routes tend to have more price dispersion than shorter routes. Route 
distance has the coefficient estimate of 0.033, which is the third highest of the main effect variables. The 
rationale behind this finding is that on longer routes, there tends to be less competition, which reduces the 
competitive pressure to compete on price. Furthermore, some passengers prefer more services on longer 
distance flights due to the longer times that they spend in the airplane, which leads to less price sensitivity 
and more price dispersion. The finding of this study is consistent with prior research of Hayes and Ross 
(1998) who found that dispersion increases on longer route distances. For example, if route distance on a 
city-pair route increases from 0.25 to 0.30 (20% increase in route distance) price dispersion can be 
expected to decrease from 0.055 to 0.057 (3% increase in price dispersion). In comparison to multi-
market contact, route distance has much less effect on price dispersion. 
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Hub Airport 
H6 is supported (β6 = -0.044), indicating that when the city-pair route is connected to an airport that is 
a hub for at least one airline (other than a focal airline), price dispersion on that route tends to be less. In 
other words, in a local market where there is a dominant, local firm, (but not dominant nationally) less 
price dispersion occurs. This finding is consistent with prior research of Hayes and Ross (1998) who 
found that dispersion was less in routes connected to hub airports than in routes connected to non-hub 
airports. Hub airport has the coefficient estimate of -0.004, which is the third highest of the main effect 
variables, which is the smallest of all the coefficients, but still has a significant influence on price 
dispersion. For example, if at least one of the airports on a city-pair route becomes a hub (the ‘hub 
airport’ variable changes from 0 to 1), price dispersion can be expected to decrease from 0.047 to 0.043 
(9% decrease in price dispersion). In comparison to a 10 % increase in multi-market contact, if at least 
one of the airports on a city-pair route becomes a hub, the magnitude of the effect of the hub airport is 
similar, but opposite in direction of a 10 % increase in multi-market contact’s effect on price dispersion. 
 
Model Fit 
One of the key objectives of this research is to evaluate and demonstrate the benefit of including an 
evaluation of the macro competitive environment (i.e., multi-market contact) on price dispersion in local 
markets. TABLE 3 provides the comparison of the results from the models discussed. When market 
concentration is applied exclusively to explain price dispersion, the adjusted R2 value is 0.182, meaning 
that market concentration explains 18.2% of the variation in price dispersion. By including multi-market 
contact and the interaction of concentration and multi-market contact, 20.9% of the variation is explained 
and with the full model, 24.2% is explained. The increase in adjusted R2 from 0.182 to 0.242 is a 33% 
increase in adjusted R2 and demonstrates the value of considering multi-market contact and local market 
conditions when evaluating price dispersion.   
 
TABLE 3 
COMPARISON OF RESULTS 
    
Condition Adjusted R2 
Change in 
Adjusted R2 Percent Improvement 
Market concentration 




interaction (MMC x 
HHI) 
0.209 0.027 15% 
Full model 0.242 0.060 33% 
 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
 
The purpose of this empirical study has been to comprehensively evaluate the effects of several key 
competition related factors, especially multi-market contact, on price dispersion in the airline industry. 
This study supports the concept that firms respond to competition by searching for alternative ways to 
improve their performance. One of our research goals is to increase the understanding of the effect of 
multi-market contact on price dispersion. Prior research has not included multi-market contact to evaluate 
price dispersion. The results show the importance of including multi-market contact and other key market 
characteristics in models that addresses competition within markets. 
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The conceptual framework developed in this article makes a significant contribution to the 
understanding of the competitive determinants on price dispersion in a complex, service market. The 
results have the potential for application in other fixed capacity, service applications, such as 
entertainment (including sporting event venues), other forms of public transportation (e.g., trains, buses, 
and ships), and distribution of energy (e.g., electricity). This study expands the understanding of 
competition theory that may be useful to academic researchers and marketing practitioners. Also, the 
findings provide information that may be useful in the development of future government policies related 
to competition’s effect on market efficiency and social welfare. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this empirical analysis have important theoretical implications. The most significant 
academic contribution of this study is the development of a conceptual framework of the competitive 
determinants of price dispersion, including multi-market contact, in a complex service market context. 
The moderating effect of market concentration on multi-market contact has price dispersion has useful 
implications for pricing research. Linked oligopoly theory (Solomon, 1970) suggests that the degree of 
linkage between the firms in multiple markets is an imperative determinant of performance in an 
oligopolistic market. This theory assumes that multi-market firms coordinate their operations across 
markets and that this coordination affects the intensity of rivalry. In this study, the interaction of multi-
market contact and market concentration has the highest coefficient estimate (-0.236) and beta (0.377) of 
any variable in the model. This result demonstrates that increasing market concentration dampens the 
effect that multi-market contact has on price dispersion. Therefore, if price dispersion is desirable in order 
to increase social welfare and improve industry performance, less market concentration is beneficial.   
An additional theoretical implication is the extension of multi-market competition theory to price 
dispersion. This theory suggests that when two rival firms compete in multiple markets, intensity of 
rivalry decreases due to mutual forbearance (Bernheim & Whinston, 1990; Baum & Korn, 1996; 
Jayachandran, Gimeno, & Varadarajan, 1999). This decrease in rivalry results in greater price dispersion 
due to firms feeling less pressure to match or be close to competitors’ prices. This study shows that multi-
market contact has a significant influence on price dispersion. Multi-market contact has the highest 
coefficient estimate (0.193) and beta (0.327) of the main effect variables. This result supports the theory 
by demonstrating that as the degree of multi-market contact increases, price dispersion tends to increase.  
 
Managerial Implications 
Airlines, as well as other fixed capacity, service organizations, are seeking information to help them 
improve the financial performance of their organizations. This study has several useful and valuable 
implications for managers. The information presented can be useful to marketing managers in developing 
pricing strategies by helping them better understand likely competitive reactions to changes in market 
structure. This information about the effects of competition on price dispersion applies to managers 
working for firms that are considering entering new markets. Also, the information can be useful to 
mangers of rival firms working in the local market when a rival firm enters the local market. 
Managers can apply this framework on price dispersion is number of ways. The following are a few 
key opportunities: 
1. Evaluating the effect of strategic moves (e.g., pricing strategies, market entry and exit) on local 
market price dispersion).   
2. Improving the evaluation of local market attractiveness before firms enter new, local markets; 
revenue potential and profit potential are important considerations. Price dispersion has an 
important influence on revenue and profitability.   
3. Predicting how rival firms, who they compete against in other markets, may affect the price 
dispersion in the local markets, if their firm or a rival firm enters the local market.   
 
Managers have the means to measure all of the independent variables in this study. By measuring and 
evaluating these variables, the model developed in this study predicts the effect of competition on price 
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dispersion. The findings suggest that managers can benefit from monitoring and assessing multi-market 
contact and market concentration in local markets when making pricing decisions. A better understanding 
of the factors (i.e., multi-market contact, market concentration) that cause price dispersion to expand or 
contract provides important and useful information to managers developing pricing strategies and setting 
prices. 
 
Future Research  
Several implications and direction for future research can be drawn from the results of this study, as 
well as from some of the limitations. First, since the findings of this study are based on firms in a single, 
geographically bounded industry during one quarter, it is possible that the results reflect some factors 
specific to the industry, geographic region, or period under study. Further replications of this study in 
other circumstances are needed to address this possibility.   
Second, development of a comprehensive variable for strategic competitive heterogeneity that may 
include multi-market contact and strategic similarity is worth exploring. One of the fundamental issues is 
to determine what characteristics of firms set them apart from competitors in ways that affect their 
marketing strategies and how consumers perceive value of their product offerings. When firms can 
increase the perceived value of their product offerings, they can increase sales revenue, profitability 
relative to other firms with less attractive products. Findings of this research show that multi-market 
contact in conjunction with market concentration improves the potential for firms to increase their 
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FIGURE 2 
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